

The Chronicle

WEEKLY

ISSUE 003

JUNE 22, 2026

2027 polls: The opposition's greatest dilemma is not Ruto

BEFORE THE OPPOSITION CAN CONVINCe KENYANS IT IS READY TO GOVERN, IT MUST FIRST CONVINCe ITSELF IT IS READY TO UNITE.



Reparations, resistance, and the unfinished business of 2024

COMPENSATION MAY EASE THE PAIN, BUT ONLY ACCOUNTABILITY CAN CLOSE THE WOUND.

The imprudent trend of celebrities confessing to crimes online

THERE IS A DANGEROUS MISCONCEPTION THAT PUBLIC ADMISSIONS SOMEHOW REDUCE LEGAL LIABILITY.

The Chronicle

WEEKLY



IN THIS ISSUE

PERSPECTIVE

Kenya's G7 seat was met with applause, but the bills are still due

Ruto arrived in Évian as Africa's top diplomat; left with commitments the continent has heard before.

PERSPECTIVE

KDC Explainer: What Is a Reparations Framework?

When governments acknowledge that citizens have suffered harm, they generally have two options

DATA STORY

Sh2 billion and 1,101 names, but who answers for the dead?

Kenya's first structured reparations framework allocates real money. Critics say it settles debts without naming the debtors.

BUSINESS

Kenya's creator economy reshaping the media landscape

Kenya's creator economy is not disrupting media. It is replacing it, and the industry has not caught up.

LIFE & CULTURE

The imprudent trend of celebrities confessing to crimes online

There is a dangerous misconception among Kenya celebrities that public admissions somehow reduce legal liability.

SPORTS



Sporting Budget: A double bet Kenya cannot afford to lose

Kenya has nearly doubled sports funding ahead of AFCON. But the real question is whether these commitments survive contact with fiscal reality.

The Chronicle

WEEKLY

Latest



The Chronicle Weekly is the flagship publication of the Kenya Daily Chronicle, Kenya's trusted digital news platform committed to "Kenyan News That Matters To You."

While the Kenya Daily Chronicle delivers a mix of breaking news and real-time updates across politics, business, health, sports, and lifestyle, the Weekly is its considered, curated counterpart; a deeper read for audiences who want more than headlines.

Published every Monday, The Chronicle Weekly distills the most important stories of the preceding week into a single, authoritative edition. It brings together the Kenya Daily Chronicle's signature editorial strengths: rigorous political reporting, sharp business analysis, contextual perspectives, and vibrant community coverage, in a format designed to be read, saved, and shared.

The Chronicle Weekly occupies a distinct space in Kenya's media landscape: it is neither a wire-driven news feed nor a long-form magazine, but a weekly newspaper of record; structured, comprehensive, and grounded in the journalistic values that define the Kenya Daily Chronicle. Every edition is built around the belief that informed Kenyans make better decisions, stronger communities, and a more accountable nation.

Disclaimer: Most of the images in this publication are AI-Generated.

KDC

Kenya Daily Chronicle
WhatsApp channel



Join the Kenya Daily Chronicle WhatsApp Channel and get The Chronicle Weekly directly on your phone every Monday.



www.thechronicle.co.ke



@KenyaChronicle



@KenyaDailyChronicle



@Kenya.Chronicle



Kenya Daily Chronicle

Editorial Note

Kenya spent the third week of June 2026 performing a high-wire act of geopolitical consequence. On any given afternoon, a citizen glancing at the headlines could be forgiven for a severe case of cognitive dissonance.

In Évian, France, President William Ruto stood as the sole African head of state at the G7 summit, holding court with the architects of global capital on debt restructuring and climate finance, a moment that, on its surface, confirmed Kenya's emergence as the continent's most assertive diplomatic voice.

Simultaneously, in Mombasa, the country hosted one of the world's foremost ocean governance gatherings, drawing ministers, scientists, and financiers from across the globe to a coastline Kenya was presenting as both a conservation success story and an investment frontier.

It was, by any measure, an impressive week on the world stage. The trouble is that the world stage is not where most Kenyans live.

Even as the state projected this image of an indispensable, forward-looking anchor nation, the reality at home remained stubbornly fractured.

In Nairobi, the government quietly unveiled a Sh15 billion reparations framework to compensate victims of the state-sponsored violence that convulsed the country across two protest cycles, an extraordinary, implicit admission of domestic trauma that received a fraction of the attention lavished on the president's European itinerary.



And over all of it hangs the ticking clock of June 30 — the deadline for a Finance Bill 2026 designed to plug a Sh1.146 trillion deficit that the Treasury has yet to convincingly explain to the public it is asking to bear the cost.

The dissonance is not incidental. It is, we argue, structural.

Kenya has become fluent in the language of global ambition, climate finance, blue economy, and multilateral leadership, while the institutions responsible for translating that ambition into domestic welfare remain underfunded, contested, or captured. The gap between the communiqué and the community has rarely felt wider.

This issue of The Chronicle Weekly interrogates that chasm. We trace the thread from the fine print of the new reparations fund to the fractured arithmetic of the national budget, through the leadership vacuum in an opportunistic opposition, and down to the underfunded arenas of our domestic sporting economy.

The grand stage is impressive. But as our reporting this week demonstrates, the floor beneath it remains perilously thin.

Kenya Daily Chronicle Team

Reparations, resistance, and the unfinished business of 2024



Two years after the 2024 protests triggered a profound legitimacy crisis, the Kenyan government's acknowledgement of state-linked harm has transitioned from defensive posturing to strategic policy.

The establishment of a Sh15 billion reparations fund, following the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) Reparations Framework Report, represents more than a humanitarian gesture; it is an explicit attempt to navigate the political fallout of a generational awakening.

Standing before victims and rights activists, President William Ruto declared that "a nation heals by tending to its wounds."

Yet, by framing the Sh15 billion fund as a primary mechanism for "healing," the administration is effectively testing whether financial restoration can bridge the widening chasm between the state and a citizenry demanding systemic transformation.

For many Kenyans, it was the first official acknowledgement that the state bore some responsibility for what happened during the 2024 demonstrations and subsequent protest cycles.

For others, it raised a more uncomfortable question: can a government compensate for suffering while avoiding accountability for those who caused it?

The answer may determine whether Kenya is genuinely entering a period of national healing or merely managing the political consequences of unresolved trauma.

The Price of a Life


The proposed reparations framework covers victims of human rights violations committed during protest periods in 2017, 2024 and 2025. Under the framework, compensation ranges from Sh50,000 for less severe violations to as much as Sh2.5 million for cases involving death or enforced disappearance.

The government argues that reparations are intended to acknowledge suffering rather than assign criminal liability. By repeatedly emphasising that compensation is not an admission of guilt, the state utilises this distinction as a political tool to de-link financial restitution from institutional reform.

This allows the administration to manage the immediate optics of "healing" while insulating the security apparatus from the structural accountability that a criminal process would necessitate. That distinction matters.

A criminal prosecution seeks to determine responsibility and punish wrongdoing. Reparations seek to recognise harm and provide some measure of restoration. The two processes are related but not interchangeable.

For victims, however, the difference can feel academic. Families who buried sons and daughters after the 2024 demonstrations continue to ask the same questions they asked two years ago. Who gave the orders? Which officers fired live rounds? Why have so few investigations produced visible consequences?



Money may help pay school fees, medical bills and funeral debts. It cannot answer those questions.

The government appears aware of this tension. In presenting the reparations programme, officials framed it as one component of a broader reconciliation process rather than a final settlement.

Whether that broader process materialises remains unclear.

A Nation Heals?

The language of healing has become central to the government's messaging. President Ruto's assertion that nations heal by tending to their wounds reflects a growing recognition that the political crisis of 2024 was not simply a security challenge. It was also a legitimacy crisis.

The protests exposed a widening disconnect between state institutions and a younger generation of Kenyans who increasingly view government through the lens of accountability rather than patronage.

Many of those who took to the streets were not aligned to political parties. They were mobilised through digital networks, united by economic frustration and empowered by social media platforms that traditional political actors struggled to control.

The demonstrations altered the country's political landscape. They also altered public expectations. For decades, official commissions, inquiries and task forces have produced reports that generated headlines before disappearing into government archives.

The public's willingness to trust new initiatives is therefore limited. The reparations framework enters this environment carrying a burden far larger than compensation itself. It is being judged not only on the payments it promises but on what it represents.

If implemented transparently and accompanied by institutional reforms, it could become a rare example of a state acknowledging wrongdoing and attempting corrective action.

If delayed, politicised or selectively applied, it risks becoming another symbol of promises made and forgotten. The challenge for the government is that healing requires more than recognition. It requires trust, which remains in short supply.

Parallel Realities

The strategic nature of the reparations fund becomes most apparent when analysed alongside the state's sluggish response to the crisis of gender-based violence (GBV) and femicide. This disparity serves as a study in how the state prioritises systemic social harm versus threats to political stability.

Over the past two years, Kenya has witnessed growing public outrage over rising cases of women being murdered, often in circumstances involving intimate partners or acquaintances.

The crisis prompted the establishment of a Presidential Taskforce on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide, which produced recommendations aimed at prevention, protection and prosecution.

Yet implementation has been slow. Many recommendations remain largely aspirational. Funding has been limited. Institutional coordination remains weak.



Families continue to navigate a justice system that often appears overwhelmed by the scale of the problem.

This creates a revealing analytical contrast: the state is moving with relative speed toward compensation for protest-related abuses because those demonstrations posed a direct threat to state stability and international legitimacy.

In contrast, the systemic social harm of GBV, while producing widespread grief, unfolds in private spaces and does not fundamentally challenge the state's immediate grip on power. Consequently, recommendations from the Presidential Taskforce on GBV remain largely aspirational and underfunded.

In one case, the state is moving toward compensation for victims of protest-related abuses. In the other, victims' advocates continue to press for action on recommendations already pending before the government.

The disparity does not mean one group deserves assistance more than another. Rather, it raises questions about how governments prioritise suffering.

Political violence generates immediate national attention because it threatens state stability. Gender-based violence often unfolds in private spaces, producing grief that is widespread but less visible.

Yet both represent failures of protection. Both involve citizens harmed under circumstances where the state carries obligations. And both require more than statements of concern.

The lesson from the reparations framework may ultimately extend beyond protests.

If Kenya accepts that victims of state-related abuses deserve acknowledgement, compensation and reform, the same logic inevitably applies to other forms of violence that continue to scar society.

Beyond Compensation

As the 2027 election cycle approaches, the reparations initiative serves as a litmus test for the government's broader electoral strategy.

It is an attempt to neutralise the "Gen Z" political movement by addressing the material consequences of the 2024 crackdown without conceding the structural reforms the protesters initially demanded.

The ultimate success of this policy will depend on whether the public accepts state-led "healing" as a substitute for justice.

While the Sh15 billion fund is a significant recognition of harm, it exists in tension with a public that increasingly views accountability through the lens of institutional change rather than patronage-style compensation.

Kenya today finds itself at a crossroads: leveraging diplomatic visibility and financial "bandages" to manage domestic unrest, while the underlying injuries of the 2024 crisis remain largely unaddressed.

Whether this fund bridges the gap to national stability or becomes another symbol of unfinished business depends on whether the state has the political will to confront the very structures that caused the injury.

The Week in Numbers

Sh2 bn

REPARATIONS

Amount set aside from the Supplementary Budget for compensating victims of political protests.

82 per cent

EL NINO

Kenya Meteorological warns of increasing chances of El Niño conditions, raising concerns over flooding late 2026.

122 to 40

PARLIAMENT

The margin by which the Finance Bill 2026 passed in the National Assembly on Thursday. 187 MPs were absent.

Sh98.5 bn

REVENUE

The expected additional revenue from the bill to finance the Sh4.82 trillion national budget

Quote of the Week



“ The significance of ADR extends beyond social justice; it is increasingly becoming an economic imperative. Africa seeks justice systems that serve rather than intimidate; that listen rather than dictate; and that resolve disputes rather than merely process them.

- Chief Justice Martha Koome

KDC Explainer: What is a reparations framework?

When a government acknowledges that citizens have been harmed, by state forces, political violence or systemic abuse, it faces a choice: wait for victims to pursue individual court cases, or establish a reparations framework.

Kenya has chosen the second path.

What are reparations?

Reparations are measures a state takes to acknowledge harm and provide remedy. The goal is not only financial, it is restoration, recognition and prevention.

How is it different from a court case?

In litigation, liability must be proved and damages calculated case by case. A reparations framework allows eligible victims to receive support without years of individual court proceedings.

Recognition of harm, not proof of guilt, is the starting point.

The five forms reparations can take

- Compensation: Direct financial payments to victims or families
- Restitution: Restoring what was lost: jobs, property, status
- Rehabilitation: Medical, psychological and social support
- Satisfaction: Apologies, memorials, official truth-telling
- Guarantees of non-repetition: Reforms to prevent future violations

Why the fifth pillar matters most

Without institutional reforms, of police conduct, oversight structures, legal accountability, reparations risk compensating victims for harms that will simply occur again. Critics of Kenya's proposed framework will be watching this pillar most closely.

A reparations framework addresses past suffering. Guarantees of non-repetition are meant to protect the future.

Pre-2027 polls: The opposition's greatest dilemma is not Ruto



Kenya's opposition has spent much of the past year fixated on a single question: who can defeat President William Ruto in the 2027 election? This preoccupation with personality, however, could be obscuring a more fundamental structural challenge.

The critical question is not which individual holds the broadest appeal, but whether the opposition can achieve the internal cohesion necessary to translate disparate political capital into a unified strategic force.

Across the political landscape, several heavyweights are actively positioning themselves for influence.

Former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua has repositioned himself as a formidable critic from the Mount Kenya region. With the High Court having upheld his impeachment, he is positioning himself more as a Kingmaker than a frontrunner in the opposition ranks despite insisting he will be on the ballot.

A long-term government minister and former vice-president, Kalonzo Musyoka, maintains his standing as a seasoned coalition builder. However, there are those still wary of his infamous last-minute manoeuvres that have left allies high and dry in the past.

There is Martha Karua, who is slowly seeking to shed the iron-lady tag that has been associated with her politics. Having been a running mate in the 2022 contest, Karua appears to want to go it alone and has been missing from most of the united opposition's meetups recently.

Justin Muturi, Eugene Wamalwa and Fred Matiang'i further complicate the calculus, representing critical regional interests and administrative gravitas, respectively.

There are also the new additions to the growing anti-Ruto brigade, including Nairobi Senator Edwin Sifuna and Muranga Governor Irungu Kangata.

The primary hurdle, therefore, is not a deficit of leadership but a surplus of competing ambitions; an abundance of viable candidates that risks fragmenting the very base required for victory.

Too Many General

History offers a clear precedent: opposition coalitions in Kenya succeed when leaders resolve the flag-bearer question early. The National Rainbow Coalition achieved this in 2002. The National Super Alliance eventually did so in 2017. Azimio la Umoja entered the 2022 election with a clearly identifiable presidential candidate.

Today's opposition has not reached that point.

Multiple figures are simultaneously positioning themselves as potential standard-bearers while also insisting on the importance of unity. These dual objectives, individual brand-building and collective cohesion, increasingly operate as a zero-sum game.

Without a formal mechanism for establishing hierarchy, the opposition remains in a state of perpetual internal friction. Every public rally becomes an exercise in measuring political strength. Every endorsement becomes a proxy battle for influence.

Every opinion poll becomes ammunition. The resulting discourse is characterised less by the development of a robust counter-offensive against the incumbent's record than by a contest for intra-coalition dominance.

The numbers are unforgiving. While President Ruto's approval ratings face economic headwinds, the structural advantages of incumbency, access to state resources and the capacity to set the national agenda remain significant barriers to entry. The opposition, therefore, requires consolidation, not fragmentation.

A divided opposition creates two compounding risks. First, it splits financial and organisational resources. Second, and more consequentially, it splits voter expectations. The electorate tends to reward stability and clarity of vision, whereas political elites often prioritise the flexibility of ongoing negotiations. This disconnect creates a vacuum of leadership that the incumbent is well-positioned to exploit.

The longer coalition leaders postpone difficult decisions, the harder it becomes to craft a compelling alternative narrative. By mid-2027, the opposition will not only be competing against Ruto's record, but also against the perceptions created during the coalition-building process itself.

If that process is perceived as a series of opaque power-sharing deals, voters may conclude that the opposition is more interested in the spoils of office than in the rigours of governance.

Lessons from the Past

Kenyan political history offers repeated examples of opposition alliances collapsing under the weight of succession disputes. Coalitions are typically strongest when confronting a common opponent and weakest when discussing internal hierarchy. The current opposition risks entering that familiar cycle.

Each leader brings distinct assets. Gachagua possesses visibility and a growing support base in parts of Central Kenya. Kalonzo retains experience and an established political network. Karua has positioned herself as a defender of the people. Sifuna is appealing to the young demographic, and by extension, new voters. Matiang'i appeals to voters who associate him with administrative competence. Wamalwa offers coalition-building credentials and regional influence.

Yet under the current electoral arithmetic, none of these figures possesses the individual reach to secure a national mandate without the active support of the others. Their strength lies in combination; their weakness, in competition.





Beyond Anti-Ruto Politics

There is a further strategic limitation. Opposition politics cannot survive indefinitely on opposition alone. A platform built solely on anti-Ruto sentiment is insufficient; it fails to offer a distinctive governing philosophy capable of withstanding the rigours of a multi-year campaign.

The 2024 social upheavals highlighted a profound public demand for systemic reform rather than mere personnel changes. This new generation of voters is increasingly immune to traditional ethnic or personality-driven mobilisation, more interested in outcomes than in personalities.

The opposition, therefore, faces a strategic choice. It can continue focusing primarily on criticising the administration, or it can articulate a coherent programme addressing jobs, taxation, debt, healthcare, and governance.

The latter path, while intellectually and politically more demanding, is the only sustainable route to long-term electoral legitimacy and, critically, it is more likely to win elections.

The opposition's biggest obstacle is not William Ruto. It is time. Every month spent in stalemate over internal hierarchy is a month lost to the critical task of socialising a national alternative to the status quo.

Every public disagreement reinforces doubts about cohesion. Every unresolved succession question strengthens the incumbent's position.

Political history demonstrates that presidents are rarely defeated by opposition grievances alone. Incumbents fall not because they are disliked, but because a credible, unified, and persuasive alternative emerges, one that effectively mirrors the aspirations of the governed.

The opposition still has time to build that alternative. But the clock is moving faster than many of its leaders appear to realise.

The question facing them is no longer whether they can challenge Ruto. It is whether they can first agree on who should lead the challenge, and on what terms.

OUTCOME OF RECENT KENYAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Election Year	Top Candidate (Votes)	Second Candidate (Votes)	Others (Combined Votes)
2022	William Ruto 7,176,141 (50.49%)	Raila Odinga 6,942,930 (48.85%)	93,956 (0.66%)
2017 (Oct)	Uhuru Kenyatta 7,483,895 (98.26%)	Raila Odinga (Withdrew) 73,228 (0.96%)	59,094 (0.78%)
2017 (Aug)	Uhuru Kenyatta 8,223,369 (54.17%)	Raila Odinga 6,822,812 (44.94%)	135,359 (0.89%)
2013	Uhuru Kenyatta 6,173,433 (50.51%)	Raila Odinga 5,340,546 (43.70%)	707,074 (5.79%)
2007	Mwai Kibaki 4,584,721 (46.42%)	Raila Odinga 4,352,993 (44.07%)	939,314 (9.51%)
2002	Mwai Kibaki 3,646,277 (62.20%)	Uhuru Kenyatta 1,835,890 (31.32%)	379,737 (6.48%)
1997	Daniel arap Moi 2,500,865 (40.40%)	Mwai Kibaki 1,911,742 (30.89%)	1,777,077 (28.71%)
1992	Daniel arap Moi 1,962,866 (36.35%)	Kenneth Matiba 1,404,266 (26.00%)	2,033,192 (37.65%)

Kenya's G7 seat came with applause but the bills are still due



There is a version of Kenya's G7 appearance that looks like a foreign policy triumph.

President William Ruto was the only African head of state invited to Évian, not as an observer, but, in the government's own framing, as an "agenda-shaping partner" carrying priorities agreed at the Africa Forward Summit co-hosted by Ruto and President Macron in Nairobi just weeks earlier.

Over three days, he led sessions on global finance, economic growth and artificial intelligence, and several of his specific proposals found their way into the summit's eight closing outcome documents. That version is accurate, as far as it goes.

The other version is equally true. Kenya came home to a Sh1.1 trillion budget deficit. Debt servicing still absorbs a disproportionate share of government revenue.

Borrowing costs remain elevated. And not a single dollar of new financing was announced in France.

Both things are simultaneously real. That tension is what makes the Évian summit worth examining closely.

What Ruto Actually Argued

Strip away the diplomatic choreography, and Kenya's pitch to the G7 was structurally coherent. Ruto did not go to France seeking aid.

He went seeking reform, specifically, reform of the mechanisms that make African borrowing artificially expensive.

His central argument: African economies routinely pay significantly higher interest rates than countries with comparable economic fundamentals, because lenders continue to price in a continent-wide risk premium that has more to do with assumption than evidence.

The result is a self-reinforcing cycle. High borrowing costs constrain investment. Constrained investment limits growth. Limited growth feeds the risk narrative. And the narrative keeps the rates high.

But Ruto added a figure that sharpened the argument considerably. Africa, he told G7 leaders, holds more than \$4 trillion in financial assets, in pension funds, insurance pools and central bank reserves. The continent does not lack money. It lacks the financial architecture to convert those resources into long-term productive investment.

His ask was therefore not charity. It was engineering: guarantees and risk-sharing instruments deployed through institutions such as the African Trade and Investment Development Insurance and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, designed to lower perceived risk and unlock private capital at competitive rates.

"A guarantee, though not money, is confidence," he told the assembled leaders.

He also pushed for debt restructuring progress under the G20 Common Framework, local value-addition requirements for critical minerals, Africa holds roughly 30 per cent of global reserves yet captures only a fraction of their value, and governance reforms at the IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council.



The logic is sound. The question is whether sound logic, expressed at a summit, translates into changed behaviour in bond markets and private boardrooms.

An Unexpected Agenda Item

One element of Kenya's participation at Évian received less attention than the finance debate but may prove equally significant over time.

In the session on artificial intelligence, Ruto advanced a case that most G7 delegations were not leading with: that African children are already engaging with global platforms and AI systems at scale, and that the protections built into those systems are systematically inadequate for African users.

Kenya called for stronger platform responsibility, age-appropriate design, parental controls, rapid removal of harmful content and, critically, meaningful safety measures in Kiswahili, Sheng and other African languages.

This is not a peripheral concern. Kenya's digital penetration is among the highest on the continent. The gap between the pace of AI deployment and the reach of regulatory safeguards is a live domestic issue.

The Commitments on the Table

The G7 did not ignore Kenya's priorities. The summit's formal outcomes included endorsement of guarantees, blended finance and exchange-rate risk instruments to mobilise private capital; renewed backing for debt transparency and restructuring reform; a commitment to local processing in critical mineral supply chains; expanded infrastructure partnerships through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the EU's Global Gateway; and a leaders' call mobilising more than \$870 million to address the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and the wider region.

For Ruto, this represented meaningful alignment between what Kenya brought to the table and what the summit formally endorsed.

The problem is that communiqués are not disbursements.

No specific financing package for Africa was announced. No reduction in Kenya's borrowing costs occurred as a result of the summit.

No debt restructuring deal was concluded. What emerged from France was a direction of travel, genuine momentum, in some areas, but momentum that must still navigate the long distance between political agreement and economic reality.

The Diplomacy-to-Delivery Gap

This is the structural challenge that will define whether Kenya's growing international visibility produces domestic dividends or merely diplomatic prestige. International policy reform operates on multi-year cycles. Kenya's fiscal pressures are immediate.

The domestic economy needs cheaper credit, more investment and stronger growth now, not after the next round of G20 negotiations produces an updated debt framework.

The G7 summit cannot compress that timeline. What it can do is establish commitments that serious, sustained diplomatic follow-through converts into actual reform. That work, quieter, less visible, more technical, is what will ultimately determine whether Évian was a turning point or a talking point.

The Harder Test

President Ruto's argument in France deserves to be taken seriously because it is correct.

Africa is not a basket case requiring aid. It is a continent being systematically disadvantaged by financial architecture designed for a different era, and one that holds \$4 trillion in assets it cannot yet fully deploy for its own development.

Changing that architecture requires exactly the kind of engagement Kenya is pursuing.

But African leaders have made versions of this argument for decades. The question is not whether the G7 agrees in principle. Increasingly, many of them do.

The question is whether agreement in principle becomes policy in practice. That test does not play out in Évian.

It plays out in bond spreads, in private equity allocation decisions, in the terms attached to infrastructure financing and in the speed with which debt restructuring frameworks produce actual relief.

Kenya earned its seat at the table. Earning the results is a different assignment.



G7 2026 OUTCOMES

Declaration	Key commitments	Kenya/Africa relevance
Major crises		
Ukraine	Reaffirmed sovereignty & territorial integrity; increased military support including air defence & long-range systems; tighter sanctions on Russian oil & gas	Indirect: global commodity & energy price exposure
Middle East	Called for immediate reopening of Strait of Hormuz; response to Iran's nuclear & ballistic programme; ceasefire push in Lebanon	Indirect: trade route & shipping cost exposure
Shared challenges		
Macroeconomic imbalances	Coordinated policy to reduce global imbalances; fair competition; avoid trade wars; IMF monitoring role; carry-over to G20	Debt transparency; IMF reform momentum directly benefits Kenya's fiscal position
International partnerships	Reaffirmed international solidarity; tools to mobilise private finance; guarantees & blended finance endorsed (incl. ATIDI & MIGA); debt restructuring via G20 Common Framework	Direct. Kenya's core ask: risk-sharing instruments to lower cost of capital for Africa, explicitly endorsed
Critical minerals	Local value addition & processing; traceability standards; responsible investment; shift from extraction to industrialisation	Direct. Africa holds ~30% of global reserves but captures a fraction of their value; shift supports regional industrialisation agenda
Digital & AI	Child safety online; age-appropriate AI design; collaboration with tech companies on safe AI deployment	Direct. Kenya advocated for Kiswahili & Sheng safety measures; one of few Africa-specific language wins
Ebola response	Over \$1 billion mobilised for Bundibugyo outbreak in DRC, Uganda & wider region; aligned with UN response effort	Regional health security; Kenya border proximity to outbreak zone
Cancer	Coordinated research on poor-prognosis & paediatric cancers; universal healthcare access; information-sharing frameworks	Supports Kenya's Universal Health Coverage push; aligns with domestic agenda
Migrant smuggling & drug trafficking	Dismantle criminal networks; port cooperation; anti-trafficking & anti-smuggling coordination	Indirect: regional security; Kenya as transit hub

Sh2 billion and 1,101 names, but who answers for the dead?

Kenya's first structured reparations framework covers eight years of protest violence and allocates real money. Critics say it settles debts without naming the debtors.

Total allocation

Sh2bn

Supplementary budget 2025/26

Verified victims

1,101

Across 6 violation categories

Claims documented

2,837+

1,815 via KNCHR + 1,022 via IPOA

WHAT HAPPENED, AND WHEN



WHO IS BEING COMPENSATED, AND FOR WHAT



THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP

IPOA conviction rate

4.3%

Of 820 IPOA misconduct cases (2023-2025), only 35 resulted in convictions of 49 officers.

Officers disciplined (recommended)

30

Disciplinary action recommended in additional cases; outcome unclear

Prior commissions unimplemented

TJRC

Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission recommendations never acted on.

Reparations law

None

Kenya has no statute governing reparations for framework to operate on.

The rise of Kenya's creator economy



There is a moment in every media disruption when incumbents stop dismissing the threat and start studying it.

Kenyan television stations reached that moment somewhere around 2022, when they noticed that a TikToker with a smartphone and a ring light was pulling more views on a single video than their primetime bulletin.

That moment has passed. What follows is harder. Kenya's creator economy is no longer an emerging trend.

It is an established industry, one that runs on advertising money, brand partnerships and subscription revenue, employs production teams and audio engineers, and commands audience loyalties that traditional outlets have spent decades trying to build.

The question is not whether creators have arrived. It is whether the institutions that once defined Kenyan media, the broadcasters, the newspaper groups, the radio networks, can adapt fast enough to survive the shift.

Follow the Money First

The clearest evidence of structural change is not in the content. It is in the advertising budgets. Brands are reallocating. Where marketing spend once went automatically to television and radio, procurement teams now carve out influencer budgets as a distinct line item.

A finance creator with 200,000 highly engaged followers is, by the metrics that matter to a bank or an insurance company, more valuable than a primetime slot reaching three times that audience passively.

The economics are not complicated. Creators reach targeted audiences. Brands pay for targeted audiences. The money goes where the targeting is. This has created genuine specialisation. Finance influencers attract banking and investment partnerships.


Travel creators work with tourism operators and airlines. Tech reviewers collaborate with device manufacturers. Lifestyle creators, the fastest-growing segment, partner with consumer goods companies seeking cultural relevance with younger demographics. None of this is theoretical.

It is happening now, in Nairobi and Mombasa and in the rural towns where a podcaster with a good microphone and a consistent release schedule has built a listenership that no local FM station thought to compete for.

The Infrastructure Is Real

What distinguishes the current moment from the earlier phase of Kenyan content creation is professionalisation.

The hobbyist period, posting for fun, hoping for views, has not disappeared, but it is no longer the defining characteristic of the sector.



The creators building sustainable businesses are operating with production schedules, content calendars, commercial teams and, in several cases, physical studio facilities. Some employ three to ten people. A few employ more.

The line between a content creator and a media house is now a matter of paperwork. This matters because it changes the accountability question.

When a YouTube channel reaches a million subscribers, it is not a blogger. It is a publication. When a podcast generates Sh500,000 a month in sponsorship revenue, it is not a hobby. It is a business.

The regulatory and tax frameworks have been slow to recognise this, but they are catching up, and creators who built their operations in the grey zone of informal enterprise are now discovering that formalisation has costs as well as protections.

Pressures the Success Stories Don't Mention

For every creator with a studio and a team, hundreds are operating on inconsistent income, algorithmic uncertainty and no safety net. Platform algorithms remain the single largest structural risk in the sector.

A policy change at YouTube or TikTok, a shift in how revenue is calculated, or a change in content moderation thresholds can reduce a creator's income overnight with no warning and no appeal process.

The platforms are headquartered elsewhere. Their monetisation policies are designed for other markets.

Kenyan creators operating in Swahili or regional languages frequently find themselves below the thresholds that unlock revenue features available to English-language creators in larger markets.

The mental health dimension is real and underreported. Sustained audience attention requires sustained output. The pressure to post, to maintain engagement metrics, to respond to comments and remain visible across multiple platforms simultaneously is not incidental to the work; it is the work. The burnout rate among mid-tier creators is high.

What Comes Next

Traditional media is not finished. But it is in a period of forced renegotiation, of audience relationships, of revenue models, of editorial authority.

The broadcasters and newspaper groups that will survive the next decade are those that understand creators not as competition to be absorbed or dismissed, but as a structural reality to be built around.

For policymakers, the challenge is framing. The creator economy does not fit neatly into existing categories. It is not broadcasting. It is not publishing. It is not advertising. It is all three, simultaneously, run by individuals rather than institutions.

Getting the regulatory framework wrong, either through over-reach or neglect, will cost Kenya the economic dividend it is currently positioned to capture. The sector is growing. The talent is here. The infrastructure is being built.

The only thing that can slow it down is a failure of institutional imagination.

The dangerous trend of Kenyan celebrities confessing to crimes online



We live in an era where celebrities record themselves carrying out illegal activities or admitting to past crimes, seemingly emboldened by social media's appetite for sensational content.

In March 2022, comedian and activist Eric Omondi sparked widespread debate after posting a video of himself burning what appeared to be his national identification card.

With Lucky Dube's song "Prisoner" playing in the background, Omondi set the card alight while issuing a seven-day ultimatum to presidential candidates Raila Odinga and William Ruto, demanding they present a clear agenda for addressing youth unemployment.

Omondi appeared to overlook the serious legal consequences of his actions. Section 133 of the Kenyan Penal Code states that anyone who "knowingly and without lawful authority or excuse destroys, mutilates, defaces, alters, abandons, or fails to preserve any statutory document" is guilty of an offence.

The law specifically identifies identity cards as statutory documents, and conviction carries a fine of up to Ksh 5,000, imprisonment of up to six months, or both.

While the ID featured Omondi's image, critics questioned whether he burned his genuine card or a duplicate.

Some social media users challenged him to "burn the original if you are a gangsta", while others dismissed the act as a publicity stunt.

King Kaka's Certificate Confession

Fast forward to this month, and rapper King Kaka (real name Kennedy Ombima) has publicly admitted to once running an illicit business creating fake academic certificates and payslips.

In a reflective video shared on social media in June 2026, the Wajinga Nyinyi hitmaker disclosed that as a struggling 23-year-old graphic designer, he used his skills to produce counterfeit documents he described as "original fake certificates." "I used to make fake payslips and fake certificates. Original fake certificates," King Kaka confessed. "I made a lot of people get into universities and higher-paying jobs."

The rapper recounted how he was introduced to the lucrative world of printing unverified corporate and academic documentation while seeking higher profit margins in Nairobi's River Road area. He described the meticulous precision he brought to the trade to ensure the documents bypassed institutional scrutiny.

To his surprise, several clients later returned to thank him after successfully securing employment or gaining university admission using his counterfeit designs.

King Kaka publicly apologised to Kenya’s Ministry of Education, acknowledging that his past actions had directly undermined the country’s education system.

He attributed his behaviour to youthful desperation, peer pressure, and a lack of mentorship, and cautioned young people: “Don’t be like me when I was young. Be legit.”

A confession is not a pardon

While King Kaka framed his admission as a cautionary tale, the legal reality is far more sobering. In Kenya, presenting a fake academic or professional certificate to any public entity is a serious criminal offence, and public confessions do not grant immunity from prosecution.

Employment secured using forged documents is considered null and void. The Public Service Commission (PSC) enforces automatic termination of civil servants found with fraudulent credentials.

Its 2023/2024 Annual Compliance Report recorded the dismissal of 449 civil servants who had used fake academic certificates to secure employment and promotions, representing 52.3 per cent of all employees found with fake certificates.

Out of 1,019 officers identified, action was taken against 744. The PSC warns that forgery is a criminal offence that could lead to prosecution and dismissal. Culprits also forfeit any right to pension, unpaid allowances, or accrued leave.

The PSC has directed institutions to terminate the service of any officer found to have used forged certificates and forward their names to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) for further action.

The EACC is legally empowered to recover 100 per cent of all salaries, allowances, and benefits fraudulently earned during the entire period of employment, even if the individual worked for years.

Recent cases illustrate the severity of this measure. In May 2026, the EACC arrested Mercy Akinyi Ofuwa, a former employee of the Office of the Auditor General, who allegedly used a forged KCSE certificate to secure employment.

She faces charges of forgery, uttering a false document, and fraudulent acquisition of public property amounting to Sh5,838,790 in salaries and benefits.


Separately, the EACC has filed civil proceedings to recover Sh37 million from a senior IEBC official who used a forged degree certificate to secure employment.


What the law says

Offenders are prosecuted in Anti-Corruption Courts on multiple counts:

Forgery and Uttering False Documents: Under Section 349 of the Penal Code, any person who forges a document or electronic record is guilty of a felony and liable to imprisonment for three years. Forgery is defined as “the making of a false document with intent to defraud or to deceive.”

Deceiving a Principal: Under Section 41(2) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA), an agent who gives their principal a document they know contains false or misleading information is guilty of an offence. Conviction carries a fine of up to Sh1 million, imprisonment of up to 10 years, or both.





Fraudulent Acquisition of Public Property: Under Section 45 of ACECA, convicts face mandatory fines equal to double the salary or benefit received, plus severe prison terms for those unable to pay.

Crackdown Already Underway

King Kaka's admission comes amid a significant government offensive against forged academic credentials. The EACC has raised alarm over increasing cases of academic fraud and plagiarism, warning that the trend is eroding public trust in institutions.

The Kenya National Examinations Council (KNEC) has launched a digital verification system enabling employers and universities to instantly validate KCSE certificates.

Following PSC and EACC reports identifying over 2,000 forged certificates in the public sector, the government has intensified verification measures across institutions.

EACC Secretary Abdi Mohamud has also warned that the period leading up to elections often sees a surge in attempts to forge academic documents, with the Commission particularly targeting universities, colleges, and examination bodies with lax verification systems ahead of the 2027 General Elections.

Online reactions, and a real warning

King Kaka's confession has generated mixed reactions online.

Some followers questioned the sincerity of his advice: "Hii advice ni weird sana. Which is which?" wrote one user.

Others jokingly warned that law enforcement could take an interest: "DCI looking for you," commented another.


Stephan Ndegwa observed, "Enyewe tuko Africa, that such confessions come without consequences and cancellations!" while Lince Muiga quipped: "Unataka kukujiwa na Subaru ya colour gani Rabbit."

The levity, however, masks a serious point. The trend of Kenyan celebrities confessing to crimes online reflects a dangerous misconception that public admissions somehow reduce legal liability. They do not.

The law does not distinguish between past and present offences, and public confessions can, and often do, form the basis for prosecution.

As the PSC has made clear, forgery is a criminal offence that leads to prosecution and dismissal from employment.

Sporting Budget: A double bet Kenya cannot afford to lose



There is a number buried in Kenya's 2026/27 budget that deserves more attention than it has received.

Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi has proposed Sh25.2 billion for the Sports, Arts and Social Development Fund, nearly double the Sh13.5 billion the sector received in the previous financial year.

Taken at face value, this is the single most significant investment in Kenyan sport in years. Mbadi framed it accordingly.

"Sports and arts are vital for national identity, youth empowerment and economic diversification," he said, promising that the allocation would stimulate jobs, community development and foreign exchange earnings.

The AFCON Pressure

The doubling of sports funding is, in large part, a function of a deadline.

Kenya is co-hosting the Africa Cup of Nations 2027 alongside Uganda and Tanzania, and the allocation is explicitly tied to preparations for that tournament.

Stadiums must be built. Co-hosting fees must be paid. Infrastructure gaps must close.

The numbers on the ground have been troubling. Kenya's AFCON readiness came under scrutiny amid a reported Sh11 billion stadium funding shortfall, while the cost of Talanta Stadium rose by Sh10 billion after taxes and import charges.

A parliamentary committee raised alarms last year when the Sh3.9 billion co-hosting rights fee owed to the Confederation of African Football was absent from budget estimates entirely.

The 2026/27 allocation forms part of a broader Sh45.6 billion package for Sports, Culture, Recreation and Tourism, which also includes Sh14.3 billion for the Tourism Fund.

On paper, Kenya is betting big. In practice, the question is whether commitments made at the budget podium survive contact with the Treasury's borrowing pressures through the year.

A Structural Dependency

Even with the 2026/27 boost, the underlying funding model for Kenyan sport remains fragile. Corporate sponsorship has become the sector's second pillar, but it is a pillar that bends under economic pressure.

When businesses face tighter margins, marketing budgets contract first.

SportPesa's return to local partnerships was welcomed; the structural dependence on betting companies for elite-level club football remains a governance question that has not been answered.

Beyond football, the picture grows darker.

The sports docket's allocation represents just 0.004 per cent of Kenya's total budget, a fraction that exposes the gap between political rhetoric about sport as national development and the resources actually committed to sustaining it.

Athletics, rugby, volleyball and emerging disciplines all compete for a pool that, even in a good year, is thin relative to the country's sporting ambitions.

Kenya's sporting moment, the AFCON co-hosting, the rebuilt Harambee Stars, the revived league, is real. But moments require money to become movements.

The Finance Bill will determine whether the numbers announced in the budget speech translate into facilities completed, academies funded and athletes supported.

The talent has never been the constraint. The money always has been.



The ongoing works to expand the Rironi - Mai Mahiu - Naivasha - Nakuru - Mau Summit Road to a 4 lane highway.

ISSUE 03

JUNE 22, 2026

The Chronicle

WEEKLY

www.thechronicle.co.ke